PetroChina Company Limited

InfluenceMap Score
C-
Performance Band
58%
Organisation Score
48%
Relationship Score
Sector:
Energy
Head​quarters:
Beijing, China
Official Web Site:
Wikipedia:

Climate Lobbying Overview: PetroChina demonstrates mixed engagement on climate policy, with examples of active and strategically negative engagement on the energy transition. The company appears to have communicated a positive top-line position on climate policy and has called for expanding China’s national carbon market. However, it has also opposed the EU carbon adjustment mechanism (CBAM). Additionally, the company has advocated for a continued role of fossil fuels in the energy mix, including coal and natural gas, and frequently advocated for exploration of new oil and gas.

Top-line Messaging on Climate Policy: PetroChina appears to have a mixed position on ambitious climate action in its top-line communications. In the 2021 ESG Report published in March 2022, PetroChina supported the Paris Agreement and government policy on climate actions. In a research paper published in the journal of Natural Gas Industry in August 2021, PetroChina stated support for the target of achieving carbon neutrality globally by 2050. However, in another research paper published in the same journal in February 2021, while stating support for China’s 2060 neutrality target for carbon dioxide, PetroChina argued against setting a net-zero target for other GHG emissions during the 14th Five-Year Plan period.

Engagement with Climate-Related Regulations: PetroChina appears to have limited engagement with climate policy. However, its parent company CNPC appears to be more engaged via its think tank ETRI, with mixed support for climate policies. In a November 2021 article authored by ETRI, the company called for expanding China’s carbon market to include more sectors which will eventually be affected by EU CBAM, including iron and steel, cement, aluminum, and fertilizer. In an article published in the journal of Natural Gas Industry in July 2020, ETRI suggested setting up a carbon price floor in the national carbon market to incentivize rapid decarbonization of the electricity sector. However, this position on carbon pricing appears inconsistent as ETRI did not support a more ambitious carbon price in an August 2021 article published on its website. Also, in a November 2021 article published by ETRI, the group advocated to exclude China from the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (EU CBAM), suggesting that the mechanism should observe the principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities” set out in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In a March 2022 article published on ETRI’s website, Dai Houliang, the Chairman of CNPC, suggested initiating a regulation on energy efficiency to facilitate emissions reduction. In a June 2022 blog post, ETRI stated support for the 14th Five-Year Plan for Renewable Energy Development announced by China’s National Development and Reform Commission in the same month. In terms of emissions reduction, in a blog post in May 2021, CNPC stated support for government policy on methane emission control and reduction. In an interview reported by Xinhua News in April 2022, ETRI stated support for China’s 2030 carbon peak target. However, in a March 2022 press release, CNPC disclosed that it has advocated for exemption of certain projects from emissions reduction targets during China’s Two Sessions.

Positioning on Energy Transition: PetroChina appears to have limited direct engagement on energy transition. However, its parent company CNPC has communicated actively in support of fossil fuels. In a June 2022 blog post, ETRI supported increasing renewables in energy consumption and to scale up the production of hydrogen. In a March 2022 blog post, CNPC disclosed that it has advocated for policies to support the development and deployment of CCUS in the oil and gas industry during the Two Sessions. In a March 2022 article published on ETRI’s website, the Chairman of CNPC stated support for electrification of transport however, he also appears to support a continued, albeit reduced, role for coal in the energy mix, as well as further exploration of shale gas. In a March 2021 article, ETRI stated that, considering China’s natural endowment of resources, a complete phase out of coal is unrealistic, and suggested continuing using coal with CCUS. In another March 2021 article, ETRI advocated for subsidies for deep-water gas exploration. In a research paper published on the journal of Natural Gas Industry in August 2021, PetroChina called for government subsidies to support tight gas exploration. In another paper published in the same journal in June 2021, PetroChina suggested the government to provide subsidies for electricity generation from natural gas.

Industry Association Governance: As of November 2021, PetroChina does not appear to disclose a list of its industry association memberships on its corporate website. PetroChina is a strategic partner of International Air Transport Association (IATA), and the president of PetroChina Canada sits on the board of Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). It is also a vice president company of China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation (CPCIF). IATA and CAPP have negatively lobbied on climate policies, and CPCIF has communicated in favor of fossil fuels and relevant infrastructure.

Additional Note: PetroChina is headquartered in China, where InfluenceMap’s LobbyMap platform can currently only make a provisional assessment of corporate climate policy engagement, due to limited capability to access publicly available data on this issue. As it is possible that InfluenceMap is not yet able to fully capture evidence of PetroChina's climate policy engagement activities, these scores should be considered provisional at this time.

Additional Note: CNPC is a listed company with more than 50% of its shares owned by the government of China. State-owned enterprises likely retain channels of direct and private engagement with government officials that InfluenceMap is unable to assess, and therefore are not represented in PetroChina's engagement intensity metric.

InfluenceMap collects and assesses evidence of corporate climate policy engagement on a weekly basis, depending on the availability of information from each specific data source (for more information see our methodology). While this analysis flows through to the company’s scores each week, the summary above is updated periodically. This summary was last updated in Q3 2022.

QUERIES
DATA SOURCES
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Strength of Relationship
STRONG
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WEAK
 
62%
 
62%
 
35%
 
35%
 
40%
 
40%

How to Read our Relationship Score Map

In this section, we depict graphically the relationships the corporation has with trade associations, federations, advocacy groups and other third parties who may be acting on their behalf to influence climate change policy. Each of the columns above represents one relationship the corporation appears to have with such a third party. In these columns, the top, dark section represents the strength of the relationship the corporation has with the influencer. For example if a corporation's senior executive also held a key role in the trade association, we would deem this to be a strong relationship and it would be on the far left of the chart above, with the weaker ones to the right. Click on these grey shaded upper sections for details of these relationships. The middle section contains a link to the organization score details of the influencer concerned, so you can see the details of its climate change policy influence. Click on the middle sections for for details of the trade associations. The lower section contains the organization score of that influencer, the lower the more negatively it is influencing climate policy.